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CASES NOTED
value theory" 12 has been applied. Under this rule the fair market value is
based on what use the lessee makes of his leasehold, excluding recovery
for expectant profits. While testimony is taken by appraisers the court
still has wide discretion in determining the actual amount of the award.
The "investment securities rule"13 which was applied in the instant
case entails giving the full award to the lessor, in contrast to other
methods where the court apportions the award between the parties at the
time of the judgment. 4 The lessor must invest the award in highest
grade securities and the lessee gets the interest therefrom during the
unexpired term of the lease. However, investment of the award was not
decreed in the principal case because the lessee's interest was substantially
protected since the rental payments far exceeded the return from the in-
vestment. The advantage of the "investment securities rule" is that the
court does not get involved in a maze of technicalities and formulas. 15 The
only scale that is applicable is the economic change in the security market,
and this is guarded against by the court retaining jurisdiction as was
done in the instant case, where the chancellor set the amount temporarily
at three and one-half per cent. This method removes a high percentage
of the "crystal gazing."'1  A disadvantage of this, or any fixed rule, is
that it is arbitrary and does not take into account other equitable factors
such as the premium value placed on commercial property as distinguished
from residential property.1t
It is difficult to see how any one rule can fill the need or supply the
answer in apportionment disputes. Each case should be taken on its own
merits. It is suggested that those contracting in real estate should provide
for apportionment of award in the' event of condemnation in order to
avoid the effect of a court decision in this involved and nebulous area.
F. Stewart Elliott.
TORTS -FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
Anilnonium nitrate fertilizer stored in vessels in Texas City harbor
exploded, causing 560 deaths and extensive property damage. An action
against the United States' alleged Covernment liability for the negligence
of its employees in manufacturing, packing and shipping the fertilizer.
12. Pasadina v. Porter, 201 Cal. 381, 257 Pac. 526 (1927); Bales v. Wichita
Midland Ry., 92 Kan. 771, 141 Pac. 1009 (1914).
13. In re Pfleges, L.R. 6 Eq. 426 (1868); cf. Matter of Central Park Coxnm'rs, 54
How. Prac. 313 (N.Y. 1873); see Note, 40 HARv. L. REV. 1135 (1927).
14. See note 5 supra.
15. See note 11 suqra.
16. Sce Note, 48 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1935).
17. See Comment, 33 Micii. L. REV. 1087 (1935).
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2412, 2671-80 (Supp.
1952) (Federal Torts Claims Act).
2. In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The Court of Appeals reversed 2 the District Court's decision for plaintiffs
on the ground that the acts or omissions charged fell within the exception
from the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" and held, that acts of government in
formulating and carrying out a plan for the manufacture of such fertilizer
were acts of discretion not resulting in liability. Dalehite v. United States,
73 Sup. Ct. 956 (1953). 6
Query: What is the extent of the discretionary function exception of
the Federal Tort Claims Act? The accepted principle is that no action
lies against the United States unless Congress has authorized it, and in
recognizing that if granted, such a right is taken subject to such qualifications
as may have been imposed,8 we approach an analysis of the discretionary
function exception of the Act. Congress' purpose in enacting this legislation
was to afford a more adequate remedy for injured persons by the creation
of a judicially enforceable right, supplanting the onerous private bill
method.9 However, it was considered undesirable that a tort action, in
addition to not being permitted to interfere with a recognized governmental
activity, should be used as a medium for testing the "propriety of a
discretionary administrative act."'1  The final House Report states that
the discretionary function exception" was designed to preclude claims
against a "regulatory" agency;'2 the ultimate application of this exception,
however, has been left with the courts.
Nothing approaching a definite standard has appeared in the decisions
construing and applying the exception, although some courts have
attempted to construe it traditionally to exclude judicial interference with
lawful legislative and executive action.13 In general, there seems to be a
tendency to construe this exception liberally in favor of the government.14
Indeed, this exception has been interpreted as an express reservation of im-
munity, which was not to be restricted by definement of construction. 5
Where there is a "proprietary" function involved, the courts have tended to
3. Dalehite v. United States, Civil No. 787 (S.D. Texas April 13, 1950).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (Supp. 1952) ("any claim based upon .. . the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused.") (italics supplied).
5. Dalehite v. United States. 344 U.S. 873 (1952).
6. The decision of the Supreme Court was 4-3, with Mr. Justice Clark and
Mr. Justice Douglas not sitting. Mr. Justice Reed wrote the opinion for the court;
Mr. Justice Jackson, joined by Mr. justice Black and Mr. justice Frankfurter, dissented.
7. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
8. Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 251 (1939).
9. Sen. Rep. No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1946).
10. Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on 14. R. 5373 and . R. 6463,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 6, 44 (1942).
11. See note 4 supra.
12. H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1942).
13. Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950).
14. Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430, 431 (D.C. Ala. 1949).
15. Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838 (D.C.P.R. 1951).
CASES NOTED
exclude cases from the exceptions;16 and in cases approaching a "governmen-
tal" function, the courts seem to have applied it.1 The exception has received
wide usage in denying recovery whenever there have appared official or
administrative decisions or acts, which would of necessity involve a use
of discretion on the part of the official or administrator in charge. In
one such instance, the court held that the decision of range officials not
to grant the plaintiff permission to cross public lands with his sheep was
such a decision. 8 Other acts or omissions within the exception include
the determination that migratory birds could not be hunted in a certain
year, 1' the failure of an army hospital to dispatch an ambulance promptly
where regulations provided that they need do so only "whenever practi-
cable,"20 spraying government property with a dangerous herbicide, although
cognizant of the possibility of private property damage,21 and seizing a
privately-owned coal mine. 2  In cases where there is no discretion, but
the duty to act is mandatory upon the government, such as marking a
wrecked ship,23 the exception has not been applied. On the other hand,
in situations involving large projects inherently clothed with the public
interest, similar in some respects to the instant decision, the exception
has been applied. Such cases include an abuse of discretion in releasing
too much water from behind a dam,2' and one in which there occurred
alleged negligence in carrying out the exact operational plans approved
by the authority having the discretionary power.2
5
The instant case involves a Cabinet level decision to embark upon a
fertilizer export program as part of foreign aid. The majority of the
16. Ure v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 779 (D.C. Or. 1950), afj'd, 193 F.2d
505 (9th Cir. 1951) (the government failed to keep an irrigation canal in repair over
which it had assumed a "proprietary" control; plaintiff recovered for land damage).
17. Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838 (D.C.P.R. 1951) (tree fell on
plaintiff's car after it had been weakened by disease in experimental station; denying
recovery, the court stressed the "governmental function" of agricultural experimentation).
18. Chournos v. United States, 193 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 977 (1952).
19. Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950) (plaintiff denied
recovery where protected migratory birds caused crop damage).
20. Denny v. United States, 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948) (army officer and
his wife denied recovery for death of stillborn child as a result of failure of army
hospital to send ambulance).
21. Harris v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Okla. 1952) (plaintiff
denied recovery for damage to private property caused by spraying dangerous herbicide
on adjoining government property).
22. Old King Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 124 (D.C. Iowa 1949) (recovery
denied where damages sought for refusal of Secretary of Interior to return plaintiff's
coal mine seized by government).
23. Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951)
(represents minority view).
24. Olson v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 150 (D.C.N.D. 1950) (agents of United
States having discretion to release water from behind a dam released an excessive
amount, causing damage to plaintiff's land); accord, Pacific Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 89 F. Supp. 98 (D.C. Va. 1950); Thomas v. United
States, 81 F. Supp, 881 (D.C. Mo. 1949),
25. Boyce v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950) (discretion was
not extended to minor details in over-all channel deepening project which involved
blasting which injured plaintiff's land, because details were decided by person having
the discretion).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Supreme Court, in applying the discretionary function exception, reasons
from the major premise that once a high level policy determination has
been made which involves the discretion requisite for immunity tinder
the Act, this immunity persists throughout the implementation of the
decision: "once discretionary, always discretionary." The conclusion reached
thereby is that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of
government in accord with official directives are not actionable. -0  This
ruling does not define precisely where discretion ends, or set limitations
as to whom shall exercise the discretion. Accepting the major premise
that discretion must end somewhere short of the bottom of the ladder of
authority; that is, discretion, as Congress intended it to be applied, reaches
only the higher level balancings of values, the dissent concludes that
immunity does not extend into the greater part of the operational phases
of policy decisions? Thusly, they would impose liability upon the govern-
ment in the instant case, where allegedly the negligence arose in the packing
and shipping of the ammonium nitrate.
It is submitted that the majority holding in this case too liberally
construes the application of the exception' to lower-level acts. There is an
uncertainty pervading the meaning of a "discretionary function" which,
as it has been argued, must lead to hardship and arbitrariness.28 Mr. Justice
Cardozo, speaking on limitations of the waiver of immunity by the sovereign,
has said: "The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship
enough, where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor
by reinforcement of construction where consent has been announced." '
Eloquently indicating the effect of the court's decision, the dissent observes
that the discredited doctrine of " 'The King can do no wrong' had not
been uprooted; it has merely been amended to read, 'The King can do only
little wrongs.' ,,30
Donald H. Norman.
26. Dalehite v. United States, 73 Sup. Ct. 956, 968 (1953).
27. Id. at 979.
28. Parker, The King Does No Wrong, Liability for Misadininistration, 5 VAND.
L. REV. 167, 171-72 (1952); see Coiment, 36 MARQ. L. REv. 88 (1952); Notes, 66
HARV. L. REV. 488 (1953), 101 U. PA. L. REv. 420 (1952).
29. Anderson v. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30
(1926 D7
30. Dalehite v. United States, 73 Sup . Ct. 956, 980 (1953).
